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Abstract
This study constructs Reg Q measures that account for the introduction
of small saver certificates in 1979 and money market certificates in 1978. In
nonVAR models, not properly accounting for Reg Q upwardly biases the estimated
real rate elasticity of U.S. GDP and yields rate elasticities that are not
stable enough for practical use. Although the impact of real funds rate
innovations remains sensitive to sample period, accurately measured Reg Q
innovations are significant in VARs and, in contrast to innovations in a naive
Reg Q measure, have impulse response functions that do not change much as
samples are extended beyond the early 1980s.
·1 would like to thank, without implicating, Jean Zhang and Chih-Ping Chang
for providing research assistance and Michael Boldin, Ken Emery, John (Jack)
Goodman and John Roberts for helpful suggestions. The views expressed are
those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas,
or any other staff in the Federal Reserve System. Any remaining errors are my
own.Introduction
In 1993, the Federal Reserve (1993) de-emphasized M2 and put more weight
on real interest rates as guides used in formulating monetary policy. Typical
objections to using real rates as economic indicators include the difficulty
of measuring expected inflation, variability in the interest sensitivity of
investment (or marginal product of capital) over the business cycle, and
shifts in monetary policy regimes that affect observed real rate elasticities.
Another problem is that the impact of real interest rates has changed because
of financial innovation and deregulation. This concern is particularly
relevant to housing given the large institutional changes in mortgage finance,
the sensitivity of housing to interest rates, deposit deregulation, and the
important role of housing in U.S. business cycles [e.g., Gordon (1988)] and
the transmission of monetary policy [e.g., Bosworth (1989) and Mauskopf
(1990)J. Aside from housing, there is evidence that Reg Q also affected the
availability of consumer credit and purchases of consumer durab1es [Duca and
Garrett (1995)]. Although the Federal Reserve has less influence on long-term
than on short-term interest rates, it may alter short-term rates in light of
GDP forecasts partly based on estimates of the effects of long-term real rates
on interest sensitive sectors and on overall GDP. With these considerations
in mind, this study investigates whether and to what extent changes in deposit
regulations (Reg Q) can account for changes in the observed sensitivity of
u.s. aggregate output to real interest rates since the early-1980s.
This study is organized as follows. The next section clarifies how this
study improves upon the previous literature in measuring Reg Q effects.
Section 3 describes the baseline GDP model and the data used. Then, the
fourth section presents results from including Reg Q variables, and the
conclusion discusses the policy implications of the findings.2
2. Previous Work on Reg Q Effects
Several studies have argued that the impact of interest rates on housing
has been reduced by deposit deregulation, the advent of adjustable rate mort-
gages (ARMs), and the development of the mortgage-backed securities market
[e.g., Bosworth (1989), Brueckner and Follain (1989), Kahn (1989), Pozdena
(1990), Ryding (1990), and Throop (1986)]. The larger impact of interest
rates before the 1980s has been attributed to disintermediation; it has been
argued that mortgages had been rationed more with non-price terms by
depositories when households shifted out of deposits because market interest
rates rose above deposit rate ceilings [e.g., Jaffee and Rosen (1978, 1979),
Mauskopf (1990), Pozdena (1990), Ryding (1990), and Throop (1986)].'
Not controlling for this structural change has two major implications
for housing equations. First, the observed interest elasticity of housing has
fallen since deregulation, implying that full sample estimation will yield a
rate elasticity that is too low for the pre-deregulation period and too high
for the post-deregulation period. Second, given the role of finance in
housing, omitted variable bias may affect other coefficients in such models
and lead to parameter instability over time given that most household deposit
rates were deregulated in the early-1980s.
As shown in Duca (1995), each of these implications is borne out by the
1 In a post-Reg Q era, mortgages may be partially rationed with nonprice
terms, consistent with the findings of Duca and Rosenthal (1991), because of
adverse selection/moral hazard effects [Jaffee and Russell (1976) and Stiglitz
and Weiss (1981)] and because lenders face deadweight costs of default
[Williamson (1986)]. Rosenthal, Duca, and Gabriel (1991) find that the
interest sensitivity of housing is boosted by mortgage-payment-to-income
ratios which are more likely to be binding as mortgage payments rise with
mortgage rates. Thus, lifting Reg Q has likely reduced, but not eliminated,
the effect of nonprice terms on the observed interest sensitivity of housing.3
Federal Reserve Board's model ("FRB model") of the growth rate of the real
U.S. housing stock. First, if one drops the disintermediation dummy variable
in the FRB model, the long-run real rate elasticity of housing drops by 18% as
the end of sample is extended from 1979:Q4 to 1992:Q4. Second, estimated
coefficients of key variables differ greatly when a better Reg Q measure and a
dummy for the credit controls of 1980:Q2 are added and these parameter
estimates move much less over time when the FRB model is altered in this way.
Three approaches have been used to control for disintermediation. The
first and seminal approach adds deposit outflows at thrifts as an independent
variable to housing regressions [see Hendershott (1980) and Jaffee and Rosen
(1978, 1979)]. With respect to identifying the nonReg Q interest sensitivity
of housing, a shortcoming of this approach is that deposit outflows reflect
not only disintermediation induced by Reg Q, but also the impact of interest
rates and declining income on money demand.' In addition, using a thrift
deposit variable is problematic in samples including the late-1980s and early-
1990s because of the shrinkage of the thrift industry. Finally, such deposit
flow variables are sometimes marginally significant, as in Jaffee and Rosen
(1979), though Hendershott (1980) finds them to be significant with an implied
impact that is half the size implied by the Jaffee and Rosen estimates.
A second approach to handling Reg Q effects is to separate out periods
of credit rationing when estimating the interest sensitivity of housing. This
strategy, as employed in old versions of the MPS model [Brayton and Mauskopf
(1985)], has two drawbacks. First, it throws out much of the sample when
interest rates rose sharply, thereby limiting our ability to identify the
, Money demand still falls in the short-run when interest rates rise
because deposit rates adjust sluggishly [see Moore, Porter, and Small (1990)].4
nonReg Q interest sensitivity of housing. Second, after periods of disinter-
mediation, large deposit inflows accompanied declining interest rates, and
housing starts tended to surge as pent-up demands were met. Rather than dummy
out rate terms in disintermediation periods, the current FRB housing model
uses a non-interactive dummy for these periods. Nevertheless, the rate
sensitivity in this model may still shift over time [Mauskopf (1990, p. 997)].
A third approach is to use measures of how binding Reg Q ceilings were
and thereby sort out the underlying interest sensitivity. These variables are
typically defined as the difference between a market rate and some deposit
rate ceiling when the ceiling is binding, and 0 otherwise. However, studies
indicate that estimated coefficients on such Reg Q measures are unstable over
the mid-1970s and the late-1970s/early 1980s [Ryding (1990)]. This may
reflect that some partially deregulated substitutes for small time deposits
(e.g., small saver certificates) were introduced in the late-1970s before most
deposit ceilings were lifted in 1983 [see Mahoney, et al. (1987)] and that Reg
Q effects were cushioned in the late-1970s by the secondary mortgage market
and Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) advances to thrifts.
In adopting the third approach to measuring Reg Q, Duca (1995) shows how
Reg Q measures accounting for the introduction of new deposit instruments can
improve the FRB model of housing. The current study tests these measures in
simple models of GDP. By doing so, this study provides both explanations for
and measurements of the evolution of the interest rate sensitivity of GDP that
are based not on loose references to financial innovations, but rather on
explicit measures of them. Results show that a carefully measured Reg Q
variable improves the performance of some simple macro-models.5
3. Specification and Data
3a. Baseline Specification
The baseline nonVAR specification used to assess Reg Q effects is:
8 8
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(1)
where y = real GDP, GAP = the GDP gap ([potential GDP - actual GDP]/potential
GDP), RPM = the real federal funds rate, and X denotes stationary variables
including oil price, Reg Q and fiscal policy measures, and a dummy variable
for the 1980:Q2 credit controls. A lag length of 8 quarters was used based on
the view that monetary policy affects the economy with a 1-2 year lag and
because an 8 quarter lag length generally eliminated serial correlation in the
errors in contrast to a 4 quarter lag length.
3b. Data and Variables
The variables used fall into six categories: (a) real GDP, (b) real
interest rate, (c) oil price, (d) fiscal policy, (e) exchange rate regime, and
(f) regulatory variables.
Real GDP Variables
DRI's estimate of full employment output was used to measure potential
or trend output and all real GDP terms were defined in 1987 dollars.
The Real Federal Funds Rate
The real ex ante federal funds rate (RPM) equals the nominal federal
funds rate minus the average, four-quarter ahead expectation of inflation
according to the University of Michigan's Consumer Confidence Survey. This ex
ante rate was used instead of an ex post rate for three reasons. First,
theory suggests that the ex ante rate should affect behavior more than an ex
post rate. Second, the ex ante real rate is stationary unlike an ex post real6
funds rate based on the 4-quarter moving average of past inflation. Third,
expectations are more likely to differ when the inflation rate changes in a
large and abrupt manner, such as in the disinflation of the early 1980s.'
Oil Shock Variable
To control for the short-run adjustment to oil price movements, lags of
the change in real oil prices (bROIL, where ROIL is producer price of oil
divided by the implicit GDP deflator) were included. It was not necessary to
add long-term oil terms because long-run effects of energy prices are already
reflected in the potential output series used to create the GDP GAP variable.
Fiscal Policy Measures
Fiscal policy was measured by DRI's estimate of the real full employment
federal surplus divided by DRI's full employment real GDP series.' To save on
degrees of freedom, only one lag of FES was included because later lags were
very insignificant, reflecting that fiscal policy hits the economy quickly.
(Qualitative results were unaffected by including the t-2 to t-8 lags of FES.)
Exchange Rate Regimes
The switch to flexible exchange rates in 1973 may have bolstered the
effect of the real funds rate and reduced that of fiscal policy.' A dummy
equal to 1 before 1973:Q2 was interacted with RFM and the fiscal policy
measure to create RFMFIX and FISFIX, respectively.
3 Real long-term rates were not used because data on long-term inflation
expectations do not go back to the early 1960s, ex post real long rates are
not stationary, and R
21
S were higher when real funds rate measures were used.
, Cohen's (1989) fiscal impetus measure scaled by DRI's full employment
GDP estimate was used in other runs. Although Cohen's measure may be superior
in principle, FES yielded higher R"s in comparable runs while the qualitative
results w.r.t. interest rates and Reg Q effects were unaffected.
, Although the U.S. went off the gold standard in 1971, the dollar's
value was reset and the dollar was not allowed to fluctuate until 1973:Q2.7
Regulatory Variables.
Several Reg Q measures and a dummy for the credit controls of 1980:Q2
were tested in different permutations of equation (1).
Reg Q Spreads. Three Reg Q variables were based on spreads between market
rates and deposit rate ceilings, which raises three issues: (1) which retail
deposit rate to use, (2) whether rate ceilings for thrifts or banks should be
used, and (3) how to handle the introduction of market-rate based deposits
prior to the lifting of rate ceilings on nontransactions deposits in 1983.
With respect to issue (I), the Reg Q spreads reflected regulations
affecting small time deposits for two reasons. First, small time deposits
have maturities closer to that of mortgages than those of demand or passbook
savings deposits. Second, most market-based deposits that were introduced in
the late-1970s were, by design, substitutes for small time deposits.
In handling issue (2), rate ceilings on thrifts were used. Thrifts were
much more important horne mortgage lenders owing to tax incentives that
encouraged thrifts to hold mortgages and because rate ceilings on thrift
accounts were as high or if not higher than those on bank deposits.
In addressing issue (3), there were two types of partially regulated
deposits that were legally allowed before 1983: small-saver certificates
(SSCs) and money market certificates (MMCs). Using SSC regulations to
construct a Reg Q variable is preferable on two grounds. First, the maturity
of SSCs (2 to 4 years) was more relevant for funding mortgages than that of
MMCs (6-months). Second, the minimum balance requirements on SSCs ($500-
$1,000) were much more similar to those on retail deposits than were the
requirements on MMCs ($10,000) over the late-1970s and early-1980s. This
latter factor made SSCs more substitutable for small time deposits.8
On the other hand, because they lacked rate ceilings, MMCs had an
advantage over SSGs. In addition, different minimum balance requirements may
not have made SSGs substantially more effective in reducing disintermediation
than MMCs for two reasons. First, the minimum balance requirement on MMCs
equaled the minimum size of Treasury securities in the late-1970s and early
1980s, and Treasuries were the main competing financial asset for retail
deposits. Second, because they were federally-insured, MMCs allowed many
thrifts and small- to mid-size banks to issue a non-traded substitute for
uninsured large time deposits. Because this market was not very deep at the
time, many depositories were not effectively able to issue large time deposits
until the mid-1980s. Because mortgage markets had been dominated by such
institutions up through the mid-1980s, MMGs enabled many thrifts and non-money
center banks to raise loanable funds when Reg Q was binding in the late-1970s
and early 1980s. Thus, the advent of MMGs rather than of SSGs may have ended
Reg Q-induced disintermediation. Therefore, it is an empirical issue whether
Reg Q effects more closely reflected regulations on MMGs or on SSGs.
Given these considerations, three Reg Q measures were defined using
spreads between market interest rates and small time deposit and/or SSG rate
ceilings. One (REGQU) equaled the quarterly average spread between the three-
year Treasury rate and the rate ceiling on three-year small time deposits when
the ceiling was binding, and 0 otherwise. In May 1982, ceilings on 2-1/2 to
3-1/2 year small time deposits were lifted. This measure is similar to that
of Ryding (1990) and serves as a benchmark for comparing the performance of
more detailed Reg Q measures. The second Reg Q variable (REGQSSG) equals
REGQU before 1979:Q3. Starting in 1979:Q3 when SSGs were created, REGQSSG
equals one of the following based on quarter averages of monthly data: (a)9
any legislated spread between market interest rates and SSC rates (0 to 50
basis points in certain quarters), (b) the maximum of 0 and the 2-1/2 year
Treasury yield (constant maturity) minus any legislated cap on SSC rates, or
(c) 0 since August 1981 when rate ceilings on SSCs were removed.' The third
Reg Q variable (REGQMMC) equals REGQU until 1978:Q2 and 0 thereafter on
grounds that MMCs did not have any rate ceilings on them. Historically,
REGQMMC is very similar to a Reg Q variable that assumes that Reg Q effects
ended when ceilings on large time deposit rates were lifted in 1976. For
details on deposit regulations, see Mahoney, et al. (1987). Accounting for
SSCs results in a Reg Q variable that is smaller over 1979-81 (see Figure 1).'
1980 Credit Controls. A dummy was included for the imposition of credit
controls (CONTROL) in 1980:Q2, which equaled 1 in 1980:Q2.' Although they
exempted household borrowing, the controls depressed borrowing because many
consumers thought that it was illegal to borrow and because many lenders
, In January and February 1980, SSC rates were set at 50 basis points
below the 2-1/2 year constant maturity Treasury yield. In March and April
1980, sse yields could be as high as the maximum of 12 percent and the 2-1/2
year constant maturity Treasury yield minus 50 basis points. From June 1980
through July 1981, sse yields could equal the 2-1/2 year constant maturity
Treasury yield when this yield was between 9.5 and 12.0 percent, could be as
high as 9.5 percent when this Treasury yield was below 9.5 percent, and could
be as high as 12.0 percent when this Treasury yield exceeded 12.0 percent.
, One drawback of these measures is that they do not control for the
declining role of deposits in funding mortgages. The secondary mortgage
markets also reduced the impact of Reg Q by allowing originators to sell
mortgages. However, these markets were not very well developed until the mid-
1980s and thus, may not have altered the impact of Reg Q effects much. In
regressions not presented here, multiplying the Reg Q terms by the shares of
mortgage originations held by depositories did not improve model fit, nor did
multiplying Reg Q measures by the liability share of retail deposits at
thrifts to control for the growing use of large time deposits which were not
subject to rate ceilings (this shift was small up through the early-1980s).
, Real GDP fell at a annual rate of 10% in 1980:Q2. In a comment on
Hendershott (1980), Jaffee (1980, p. 447) remarked that, "the 1980 credit
crunch would rank among the best.", albeit it is something of a new breed. II10
Percent
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curtailed all types of loans in order to meet overall loan targets and to
limit their credit risk exposure during this depressing regulatory episode.
Because the 1980:Q2 episode is a very large outlier that owes to an unusual
government intervention, not accounting for the credit controls can result in
substantial omitted variable bias as found by Duca (1995) and Emery (1995).'
4. Results
This section assesses how the observed real rate sensitivity of GDP is
affected by Reg Q. First, regression results are reviewed. Then, rolling
regression estimates of real rate elasticities are presented. Finally, VAR
results are presented. Both nonVAR and VAR findings are provided because each
approach has relative advantages. VARS have an advantage over nonVARs because
they can, in principle, assess the impact of exogenous changes in monetary
policy. On the other hand, changes in the Fed's reaction function could make
it difficult to identify exogenous from endogenous monetary policy moves [see
Sims (1992)]. As a result, VARs may run into misspecification problems that
may cause impulse response functions to be very sensitive to sample periods.
While the VARs examined in this study remained sensitive to sample periods,
VAR (and nonVAR) models were improved by including REGQSSC.
4a. NonVAR Regression Results
Reg Q variables were assessed with and without oil and exchange rate
regime variables. Table 1 reports regression results from models including no
exchange rate or real oil price terms, whereas table 2 presents findings from
models with both types of variables. To conserve space, the tables report the
sum of coefficients on lags of GDP growth, real funds rate, and Reg Q
, The inclusion of a credit control dummy actually reduces the
statistical significance of Reg Q variables. Nevertheless, the preferred Reg
Q variable, REGQSSC, remains highly significant in its presence.11
variables along with F-statistics in parentheses. Two samples are used:
1960-94 and 1960-82. Both begin in 1960 owing to the availability of data on
GAP and FES, and the thinness of the federal funds market in the 1950s. One
sample ends in 1982 for two reasons. First, it is interesting to see how the
estimated real rate elasticities may have changed since the passing of Reg Q
ceilings on small saver certificates late in 1981. Second, 1982 provides at
least 10 years of sample when exchange rates were flexible.
Several patterns emerge across the real federal funds rate regressions
reported in table 1. First, the sum of RFM coefficients has the expected sign
in each model, but RFM lags are jointly significant only in the nonReg and
REGQSSC models. Second, the joint significance of lags of RFM rises slightly
when lags of REGQSSC are added, but falls when lags of REGQU or REGQMMC are
included. Third, the credit control dummy is always significant, in contrast
to the fiscal variable whose significance is sensitive to the inclusion of
other variables. Fourth, among the Reg Q variables, only lags of REGQSSC are
significant (with a negative sum of coefficients). Fifth, compared to the
nonReg model, the estimated short-run real rate elasticity of GDP is about 25%
smaller in the REGQSSC model in both samples. Using full sample estimates, a
100 basis point rise in the real federal funds rate reduces near-term GDP
growth by .82 percentage points in the nonReg model and by a smaller .60
percentage points in the REGQSSC model which strips out Reg Q effects.
Together, these results imply that carefully accounting for Reg Q effects is
important for assessing the impact of the real fed funds rate.
To control for different exchange rate regimes and for relative oil
price movements, the models in table 2 add eight lags of RFMFIX, one lag of12
FESFIX, and eight lags of ~ROIL to the corresponding models in table 1.
10 The
exchange rate regime terms are generally significant and lags of the
noninteracted RFM terms are always jointly significant, with coefficients from
the best full sample model (REGQSSC) indicating that the real federal funds
rate had less of an effect and fiscal policy had a stronger effect under fixed
exchange rates. In addition, the joint significance of each Reg Q variable
rises, with REGQU and REGQMMC becoming marginally significant in the full
sample and significant over the shorter sample. Once again, REGQSSC very
noticeably outperforms the other Reg Q measures in terms of model fit over the
full sample, and implies that after stripping out Reg Q effects, the real
federal funds rate has a smaller effect on real GDP growth. While the oil
price variables are jointly insignificant, the sum of coefficients on the
eight lags for the full sample period (1960-94) has the expected negative sign
and falls within a fairly narrow range across the models (-.0005 to -.0007).
One interesting pattern is that the marginal information contained in
lags of REGQSSC and REGQMMC is higher in models controlling for exchange rate
regime differences. One plausible explanation for this pattern is that the
coefficients on Reg Q terms may be downwardly biased by not accounting for
exchange rate regimes. Exchange rates were fixed over most of the sample
under Reg Q ceilings, but were flexible over the entire post-Reg Q era. If a
fixed exchange rate regime reduces the estimated impact of real funds rate
changes (add the RFM and RFMFIX coefficient sums for effects under fixed
exchange rates), then including lags of REGQSSC or REGQMMC without exchange
10 The one-quarter lags of FES and FESFIX were sometimes significant,
while other lags were never jointly significant, suggesting that the fiscal
policy measures have less of a leading effect than RFM.13
rate regime variables could, when estimating Reg Q coefficients, inadvertently
blend Reg Q effects of the funds rate with the weaker impact of interest rates
under fixed exchange rates. This explanation may also explain why sum of
RFMFIX coefficients is negative in the nonReg model, but positive in the
REGQSSC and REGQMMC models using the 1960-94 sample.
The models in table 2 have much higher R"s than corresponding models in
table I, and the REGQSSC model in table 2 has the highest full sample fit. On
the other hand, as samples are extended from 1960-82 to 1960-94, the short-run
real rate elasticity of GDP growth" barely changes in the nonReg and REGQSSC
models in table I, whereas those in table 2 fall a good deal. Even then, it
is noteworthy that the full sample rate elasticity in table 2 falls much more
in magnitude for the nonReg model (.01004) than for the REGQSSC model
(.00245), and that in each sample, the real rate elasticity is lower in the
REGQSSC model. In comparing tables 1 and 2, the fact that extending the end-
of-sample results in bigger changes in the estimated rate elasticities in
table 2 could simply reflect that extending the end-of-sample doubles the
period when exchange rates were flexible from 1973-82 to 1973-94.
Nevertheless, full sample results favor the models in table 2 over those in
table 1.
Full sample regression results imply that monetary policy has operated
under 3 different regulatory regimes: fixed exchange rates with deposit rate
ceilings, flexible exchange rates with deposit rate ceilings, and flexible
exchange rates and flexible deposit rates. The findings in table 2 indicate
that not properly accounting for Reg Q effects can result in an omitted
" The short-run elasticity - L(RFM coefficients)/[l-L(fiy coefficients)].
The elasticities in tables 1 and 2 are neither annualized nor converted into
percentage point effects. To do this, simply multiply them by 400.14
variable bias that gives the mistaken impression that the real federal funds
rate had a greater effect under fixed than under flexible exchange rates.
4b. Ex Posc ForecasC ResulCs
Forecasts of GDP growth starting in 1983:Ql were run using coefficients
from models in table 2 estimated using in-sample periods beginning in 1960:Ql
and actual values of all right-hand side variables since the beginning of the
forecast periods. Consistent with the regression results, the nonReg model
yielded a forecast S.S.E. that was 26% and 17% higher than that of the REGQMMC
and REGQSSC models, respectively. On this criterion, the REGQU model not only
did worse than the other Reg Q models, but even yielded an S.S.E. that was 60%
higher than that of the nonReg model. This last result further illustrates
the importance of carefully accounting for deposit regulations.
4c. The EvoluCion of Real RaCe ElasCiciCies
In addition to improving regression and forecast results, including a
carefully measured Reg Q variable is also important for obtaining real rate
elasticity estimates that are less volatile and drift less over time. Figures
2 and 3 plot estimated real rate elasticities from the nonReg, REGQU, and
REGQSSC models in table 2 using a common starting date of 1960:1 and rolling
forward up to 1994:4 (e.g., the 1985:1 data point comes from a regression over
1960:1-85:1). Figures 2 and 3 show that the estimated ex post real rate
elasticities from the nonReg and the naive Reg Q (REGQU) models are quite
volatile in contrast to the relatively more stable elasticities from the
REGQSSC models. Indeed, the variances of short-run rate elasticities from the
nonReg and REGQU models are 93% and 99% higher, respectively, over 1979:1-94:4
than those from the REGQSSC model. Furthermore, abstracting from temporary
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estimates from the nonReg model fall dramatically as the end-of-sample is
extended from 1979 to 1994, while those from the REGQSSC model do not.
4d. VAR Resul~s
VARs were run to see whether the real funds rate has different effects
in models including REGQSSC and to assess the impact of Reg Q innovations.
Along with a dummy for the credit controls of 1980:2, each VAR included 4 lags
of ny, np, GAP, nROIL, and RFM, with 4 lags of REGQSSC included in the
"REGQSSC
TI VARs.
12 The variables in the "nonReg" VAR were ordered as follows:
GAP, ny, np, nROIL, and RFM. The variables in the "REGQSSC" VAR were ordered
as follows: GAP, ny, np, AROIL, REGQSSC, and RFM.
Consistent with prior results, REGQSCC has a significant negative short-
run effect on GDP growth (Figure 4), is empirically more important than np,
RFM, and nROIL according to variance decompositions (table 3), and its
inclusion results in RFM accounting for a smaller share of real GDP growth
innovations over 1960-94 and 1973:2-94 (table 3).13 In addition, the short-
term negative impact of RFM on GDP growth is somewhat weaker in models
including REGQSSC according to the full (1960-94) sample (Figure 5) and
flexible exchange rate (1973:2-94:4) subsample (not shown to save space).
Consistent with prior results, the impulse response of ny to REGQSSC is
changes little when the sample is extended from 1960:1-82:4 to 1960:1-94:4,
while that of ny to REGQU changes a lot (Figures 6 and 7). However, somewhat
at odds with nonVAR results, inclUding REGQSSC does not affect how the impulse
~2 FES was excluded to conserve degrees of freedom because it did not
affect the qualitative results.
13Error bands show that REGQSSC has a significant negative effect in
quarters t+2 to t+5 in the full sample, in quarters t+2, t+4 and t+5 under
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response of GDP growth to RFM innovations shifts as the end-of-sample is
extended from 1982:4 to 1994:4 (Figures 8 and 9). A plausible explanation for
this discrepancy is that the Fed's reaction function shifted in the early-
1980s which could result in VARs yielding estimated funds rate effects that
are sensitive to the sample used [Sims (1992)], but which would not affect
nonVAR results that use actual, rather than predicted, Fed policy moves.
Although the impact of real funds rate innovations remains sensitive to the
sample, REGQSSC is statistically and economically significant in these VARs.
5. Conclusion
This study improves upon previous research on Reg Q by explicitly
measuring how regulatory changes have affected the observed, short-run real
rate elasticity of GDP. Findings show that Reg Q effects are economically and
statistically significant in VAR and nonVAR models. NonVARs results show that
not accounting for Reg Q effects results in omitted variable bias that
upwardly distorts the real rate elasticity of GDP and gives the mistaken
impression that adopting flexible exchange rates has weakened rather than
enhanced the effectiveness of monetary policy. NonVAR results also imply that
GDP models are unlikely to yield rate coefficients that are stable enough for
practical use unless they accurately control for regulatory changes. With
respect to recent macroeconomics controversies, these findings are consistent
with the view that the relative strength of the bank credit channel of
monetary policy has declined over time [e.g., Miron, Romer, and Weil (1995)).
These aggregate output findings are also consistent with results from
two sectoral studies. In one, Duca (1995) finds that key coefficients of a
Fed model of aggregate housing change substantially since the 1970s unless oneFigure 8
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includes an accurate measure of Reg Q effects (e.g., REGQSSC). In the other
study, Duca and Garrett (1995) find that not accounting for Reg Q effects
leads one to overestimate the current effect of fed funds rate changes on
consumer credit availability, that the availability of bank consumer loans had
not declined as much in the late-1980s as in prior credit crunches, and that a
Fed model overpredicted the late 1980's decline in consumer durables spending
unless it was modified to include an index of consumer credit availability.
In terms of which specific deposit regulations are crucial to accurately
measuring Reg Q effects, the present study finds that Reg Q variables should
account for the introduction of small-saver certificates in the late-1970s and
that the introduction of money market certificates was somewhat less
important. Because a Reg Q variable based on money market certificates would
closely mimic a Reg Q term based on large time deposit rate ceilings, the
findings imply that Reg Q effects associated with regulations on retail
deposit rates were more important than those on wholesale deposit rates. One
plausible explanation for this finding is that small- to mid-sized banks and
thrifts who once accounted for much mortgage lending, could not easily issue
uninsured large time deposits in the late-1970s and early 1980s." Because
the mortgage-backed securities markets were also not highly developed back
then, binding Reg Q ceilings led these depositories to curtail lending and
boosted the general impact of the real federal funds rate.
The Fed's use of real interest rates as a policy guide is controversial
on several grounds. Some, such as how well one can measure ex ante real
"Kashyap and Stein (forthcoming) find evidence supporting their theory
that because small banks have less access to non-core deposit funds (e.g.,
large time deposits) that small bank credit declines relative to large bank
credit during episodes of tight monetary policy.18
rates, track the equilibrium real rate over a business cycle, and control for
every conceivable monetary policy regime are beyond the scope of this paper.'s
With these caveats in mind, this study implies that if real interest rates are
used to help guide policy, one should carefully account for regulatory changes
to get a handle on the current real rate sensitivity of GDP. By constructing
a more informative Reg Q measure, this study may help U.S. policy-makers avoid
one of the pitfalls of using real rates as policy guides. In this sense,
although Reg Q ended more than a decade ago, it is still with us.
15 As a partial evidence on monetary regime effects, other nonVARs
regressions (not shown) tried interacting the real federal funds rate with a
dummy for 1979:4-82:4. One to four lags of this variable were insignificant.19
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Table 1: Real GDP Growth Regressions1
No Ex. Rate Regime or Oil Price Variables
Non Reg Non Reg REGQU REGQU REGQMMC REGQMMC REGQSSC REGQSSC
Variable 60-82 60-94 60-82 60-94 60-82 60-94 60-82 60-94
,
£i-lI1Yt.-i 0.5386 0.6533' 0.2836 0.4411 0.1173 0.4991 0.1556 0.5401
(0.94) (1.94) (0.63) (1.47) (0.56) (1.18) (0.81) (1.47)
8
L;i~J.RFMt._i -0.0009' -0.0001' -0.0003 -0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0006' -0.0012' -0.0001'
(2.14) (2.64) (0.47) (1.04) (1. 52) (2.39) (2.14) (2.59)
,
:E,.,REGQt.i -0.0028 -0.0005 -0.0040 -0.0029 -0.0043' -0.0011'
(0.90) (1. 56) (1. 20) (1. 71) (1.77) (2.22)
GAPt., 0.0957 0.1252' 0.1200 0.1065' 0.0567 0.1022' 0.0772 0.1073'
(1.41) (2.42) (1. 35) (1. 86) (0.74) (1.90) (1.08) (2.00)
DUM80Q2t -0.0345" -0.0297" -0.0264' -0.0266" -0.0403" -0.0363" -0.0291' -0.0252"
(-3.45) (-3.53) (-2.30) (-2.92) (-3.83) (-4.19) (-2.52) (-2.63)
FESt., -0.1886 0.1042 -0.2753 0.0614 0.0527 0.1461' -0.0071 0.1341'
(-0.80) (1.63) (-1.00) (0.76) (0.18) (1. 85) (-0.02) (1.66)
€RFF -0.00193 -0.00206 -0.00039 -0.00198 -0.00107 -0.00128 -0.00143 -0.00149
€REGQ -0.00390 -0.00096 -0.00458 -0.00576 -0.00514 -0.00372
d.h. -0.5452 -0.8529 0.1597 0.1791 -1.0110 -1.5039' 0.3096 -1.0866
q(24) 18.36 30.51 16.26 20.44 18.01 26.51 17.65 24.11
R' .2287 .2561 .2203 .2831 .2460 .2900 .2899 .3122
1. Sums of coefficients are listed with F-statistics in parentheses for lags of l1y, RFM, and REGQ.
*(**,-+) denotes significant at the 5% (1%,10%) levels.22










































































































































































































1. Sums of coefficients are listed with F-statistics in parentheses for lags of /ly, RFM, REGQ, /lROIL, and
RFMFIX. '(",') denotes significant at the 5% (1% ,10%) levels.23
Table 3: Variance Decompositions of Real GDP Growth'
Horizon -k- ..iUL REGOSSC LlROIL RFM
REGQSSC Model, 1960-94
4 quarters .859 .077 .054 .002 .008
8 quarters .794 .090 .064 .040 .013
12 quarters .784 .090 .070 .041 .014
16 quarters .781 .093 .070 .041 .015
NonReg Model, 1960-94
4 quarters .899 .082 .004 .015
8 quarters .823 .104 .050 .023
12 quarters .820 .106 .051 .023
16 quarters .818 .109 .051 .023
REGQSSC Model, 1973:2-94
4 quarters .826 .069 .058 .011 .035
8 quarters .713 .068 .097 .091 .031
12 quarters .700 .067 .102 .096 .036
16 quarters .696 .070 .103 .095 .036
NonReg Model, 1973:2-94
4 quarters .846 .097 .012 .045
8 quarters .744 .116 .092 .047
12 quarters .741 .117 .094 .047
16 quarters .740 .118 .094 .047
1. Each model includes a dummy for the credit controls of 1980:Q2.RESEARCH PAPERS OF THE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT
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